Capstracteconcapstract:2611.00016

Economics > General Economics

Title:Retention of Title and Demand for Irreversible Disposal

Abstract:

Providers of irreversible disposal services can act as agents of the owner or acquire title as part of the transaction. In a posted-price experiment with 640 households at four sites, we vary the disposition of title while holding the service provider, payment schedule, and physical outcome fixed. Title transfer increases acceptance by 15.3 percentage points over five signed offers (95% confidence interval 8.4 to 22.2). At zero compensation, 51.6% accept under transfer, compared with 28.1% under agency. Both contracts eliminate the owner's right to recover the object at the same moment. The data identify the effect of offering a different contract at each price. An interpretation in euros requires assumptions about the reservation amount between the prices we observe. We report bounds for the mean reservation amount over the sampled price range and discuss what the contract comparison can establish about the value of retaining an object with an unverified use.

Comments:3 figures, 4 tables, 3 appendices
Subjects:General Economics (econ.GN); Econometrics (econ.EM)
Cite as:capstract:2611.00016 [econ.GN]
 (or capstract:2611.00016v1 [econ.GN] for this version)

Submission history

From: Maëlle R. Dervaux
[v1] Sat, 7 Nov 2026 18:13:15 UTC (187 KB)

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