Quantitative Finance > Trading and Market Microstructure
Title:Liquidity Provision before a Terminal Event
Abstract:We study secondary trading in a short-lived claim whose settlement depends on the identity of the last agent to act. The underlying event is held fixed while the trading protocol and dissemination of an informative signal vary independently. In 864 laboratory markets, clearing in two-second batches reduces the transfer from resting to newly submitted orders by 2.3 credits per round when the signal is public, compared with 0.6 credits when it is private. The difference is 1.7 credits (95% CI 0.4–3.0). Contracts settle against independently coded recordings of four-person applause. Posture is informative about cessation, including in recordings where the last audible contact follows an interval of collective silence. Settling at the apparent end of applause instead changes the payoff on 19 of 288 distinct claims. The change attenuates the estimated protection of resting orders under public disclosure.
Submission history
From: Élodie M. Varencourt[v1] Sat, 7 Nov 2026 08:34:10 UTC (168 KB)